In this article written by Intellectual Property Magazine, Mathys & Squire Partner Jeremy Smith provides his commentary in response to the recent news that the South African patent office (Companies and Intellectual Property Commission Department of Trade and Industry (CIPC)) has issued the world’s first patent for an invention that lists an artificial intelligence (AI) as the inventor and the AI’s owner as the owner of the patent.
Secured by University of Surrey professor Ryan Abbott and his team this week, the patented invention was generated by the artificial neural system DABUS (Device for the Autonomous Bootstrapping of Unified Sentience) and created by CEO of Imagination Engines’ Stephen Thaler.
DABUS is an extensive artificial neural system that combines the memories of various learned elements to create new and complex concepts.
Inventions conceived by DABUS include an emergency warning light and a food container that improves grip and heat transfer.
The patent is the subject of ongoing proceedings including in the US, UK, Germany, Australia and at the European Patent Office.
In September 2020, England & Wales High Court Justice Marcus Smith held that AI cannot be a listed inventor on a patent.
Siding with the UK Intellectual Property Office, Justice Smith ruled that it is “quite clear from the statutory scheme contained in the UK Patents Act 1977 that – whatever the meaning of the term ‘inventor’ – a patent can only be granted to a person”.
Smith said he reached this conclusion “explicitly without considering the meaning of the term inventor” and emphasised that the wording of the ’77 Patents Act “makes clear that the holder of a patent must be a person.”
The justice concluded, “DABUS is not, and cannot be, an inventor within the meaning of the 1977 Act, simply because DABUS is not a person.”
Welcoming the win, Abbot said, “We see this issuance as a key step toward recognition of the importance of encouraging individuals and companies to make, develop and use AI to generate socially valuable innovations.”
He added, “As AI continues to advance and to increasingly perform human sorts of activities, this will result in a host of challenges and opportunities for businesses, including with respect to disputes.”
Mathys & Squire’s Jeremy Smith commented, “Whilst the grant of a patent in South Africa that names an artificial intelligence as inventor provides for attention grabbing headlines, we need to be careful not to infer too much from this occurrence. Unlike other countries, such as the UK and US, in which patent offices have concluded (and the courts have upheld) that an AI cannot be considered an inventor under current legislation, the South African patent office does not carry out substantive examination of a patent application before grant.”
He added, “Instead, potential issues with a granted patent are left to the courts, should the granted patent ever be challenged. Accordingly, the grant of the DABUS patent in South Africa is not an indication that the South African patent office has accepted that an AI can, legitimately, be a named inventor – the patent office may simply not have considered the issue.”
This article was written by Intellectual Property Magazine in July 2021.
At the European Patent Office (EPO), one of the first steps for assessing inventive step of a claim is to determine the closest prior art. For medical use claims, the closest prior art is typically held to be a document relating to the same medical use as that claimed – when selecting the closest prior art, the first consideration is that it should be directed to a similar purpose or effect as the invention (Guidelines for Examination at the EPO, G-VII, 5.1). Thus, where a claim is directed to ‘X for use in treating disease Y’, the closest prior art would normally be a document directed to the treatment of disease Y, which position bears out in the existing case law (e.g. T 2571/12). However, a recent decision – T 2443/18 – issued by a technical Board of Appeal of the EPO, did not follow this approach.
In T 2443/18, the claim in question was directed to the known drug tapentadol for use in the treatment of irritable bowel syndrome (IBS). Surprisingly, the Board of Appeal found that a document (D4) relating to tapentadol and confirming its efficacy in the treatment of visceral pain in animal models, was a suitable starting point giving a ‘workable route’ to the claimed invention. This was despite there being another prior art document (D3) on file directed to the use of a compound of the same functional class (another μ-opioid receptor agonist) in the treatment of IBS specifically (i.e. a document relating to the same purpose or effect as the invention). The Board noted that “if inventive step is to be denied, the choice of starting point needs no specific justification”, before going on to find that the claimed subject-matter lacked inventive step starting from D4. It also seems that additional weight was given to the relevance of D4 based on experimental data and comments in the patent in suit which showed the benefits of tapentadol in the treatment of ‘visceral hypersensitivity and referred pain’ as ‘major symptoms’ of IBS.
When trying to convince the Board that a document directed specifically to the treatment of IBS should be considered the closest prior art, the patentee argued that a drug developer would typically seek to provide a suitable drug for a given medical indication, rather than investigate new medical indications for a known drug. The latter approach was also alleged by the patentee to risk obscuring the proper assessment of inventive step by impermissible hindsight knowledge of the invention. However, the Board of Appeal did not find these arguments convincing. The Board instead found that:
“either approach may be taken by a person skilled in the art, depending on the stages reached in the development and life of a drug compound and the rationale for its development.”
The Board also noted the similarity between IBS and visceral pain and found that:
“Document D4 relates to tapentadol and its confirmed efficacy in animal models of visceral pain… While D4 does not specifically refer to IBS, visceral pain is a typical manifestation of IBS, the therapeutic indication named in claim 1 of the patent in suit. In view of this considerable overlap in technical features and purpose… D4 cannot be ruled out as a suitable starting point for the assessment of inventive step”
Accordingly, the Board appears to have diverged from the usual approach to the selection of the closest prior art in view of the stage reached in the development of tapentadol and the overlap in technical features and purpose of using tapentadol to treat visceral pain.
Certainly, T 2443/18 was decided based on the specific facts of that case, and it is clear that the Board gave significant weight to the efficacy of tapentadol in the treatment of visceral pain shown in the prior art and indications in the patent in suit that visceral pain was a symptom of IBS (i.e. the indication claimed), when considering whether D4 was a suitable starting point for the inventive step assessment.
However, this decision may reflect more of a willingness of the Boards of Appeal to consider different possible starting points in considering the inventiveness of medical use claims, including those which may be less relevant to the purpose or effect of the invention than other cited prior art. Indeed, in another similar decision – T 0641/18 – issued by the same technical Board of Appeal, the closest prior art document was again found to be a document directed to the claimed compound for use in a similar (but not identical) medical indication to that claimed.
In T 0641/18, the Board highlighted the similarity by which the claimed compound exerts its effect in the two medical indications. However, no mention was made of the stage reached in the development of the drug in question. Importantly, the claim in T 0641/18 was still found to comprise an inventive step because the closest prior art document specifically taught that the similar medical indication and claimed medical indication are not expected to be treated using the same compounds.
It remains to be seen whether different EPO technical Boards of Appeal will follow the approach set out in T 2443/18 and whether it will become more difficult in the future to demonstrate an inventive step for a claim directed to a new medical use of a known medicinal compound, particularly where there is any overlap in symptoms of the new indication versus those the compound is already known to treat.
By a press release earlier today, the Enlarged Board announced its decision on the compatibility of oral proceedings by videoconference with the rights of parties under Article 116 EPC, where not all of the parties have consented to that format.
The Enlarged Board has limited itself to answering the referred question in relation to proceedings before the Boards of Appeal (i.e. the situation dictated by new Article 15a RPBA) and to the presence of a ‘general emergency’. In those situations, the ruling of the Enlarged Board states that oral proceedings by videoconference held without the consent of the parties during a period of “general emergency impairing the parties’ possibilities to attend in-person oral proceedings at the EPO premises” are compatible with rights under the EPC.
This arguably leaves open the question of how a ‘general emergency’ is to be defined, and whether this requires a state of general emergency to be formally declared. Nevertheless, the EPO in its own press release this morning (Friday 16 July 2021) has stated that oral proceedings by videoconference will continue to be scheduled in accordance with its current practice, due to the ongoing pandemic situation in the EPO Contracting States and beyond.
We now await the formal reasoned decision, which may yet have implications for the scheduling of oral proceedings by videoconference before the departments of first instance (Examination and Opposition Divisions) as well as the Legal Division and Receiving Section. Indeed, the EPO has indicated that it will be carefully analysing the reasons for the decision once issued for any such implications.
For further information relating to the G 1/21 case up to this point, read our previous article here.
Following delays throughout 2020 (see previous article here), on Friday 9 July 2021, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled on two urgent applications against the ratification of the Unified Patent Court (UPC). In both cases (2 BvR 2216/20 and 2 BvR 2217/20), the petitions were rejected as inadmissible, as – in the court’s view – there was insufficient substantiation.
Thus, the path is finally clear for Germany to ratify the UPC, creating a common court system for patent litigation across European Union member states.
There is now hope that ratification can be completed in Germany before the federal elections in September 2021. Directly after that, the ‘Provisional Application Period’ will begin, during which time the UPC will be equipped. For the upcoming tasks, such as the recruitment of judges and the staffing of the administration, a period of at least eight months is initially planned, which can be extended, if required.
The realistic target for the start of the UPC system is likely to be 1 January 2023. Until then, among other things, it must be clarified in which member state the headquarters of the pharmaceutical division of the UPC – which, prior to Brexit, was originally planned to be based in London – will be located. At present, Italy is the most likely option, since it has joined the group of three strongest users following the UK’s withdrawal from the UPC. It can therefore be assumed that the pharmaceutical division will be based in Milan.
The widely anticipated European Patent Office (EPO) decision in case G 1/21 has been delayed thus far by ongoing discussions in relation to partiality of the members of the Enlarged Board of Appeal, which has been the subject of two interlocutory decisions.
Following the first of those decisions, the composition of the Board was changed by order of 20 May 2021. The appellant (opponent, Rohde & Schwarz GmbH & Co KG) made submissions raising further objections, including requests for replacement of additional members of the Enlarged Board and referencing for the first time the issue of “personal interest” of the members. In a non-public discussion during the originally scheduled (first) oral proceedings of 28 May 2021, the issue of suspected partiality was discussed. The (second) oral proceedings to decide on the referred question was postponed to 2 July 2021, in order that a decision could be issued on the further allegations of suspected partiality. That second interlocutory decision of the Board was issued on 28 June, the week of the oral proceedings, dismissing all of the appellant’s objections.
While the delay of the discussion of the actual legal issue, referred by the Board of Appeal in T 1807/15, may appear frustrating to many, it has been widely accepted that it is essential for the public to have confidence that a fair and unconflicted decision will be reached by the members of the Board. As put by Siemens AG in their amicus curiae brief: “there is a conflict between a timely decision vs. … a high-quality decision”, and most of the nearly 50 parties who have submitted amicus curiae briefs appear to concur that the importance of a high-quality decision outweighs the desire for expedient certainty.
The suspected partiality alleged by the appellant was based on the involvement of certain Board members in the drafting of new Article 15a RPBA, which entered into force earlier this year – this new Article states that the Boards of Appeal can hold oral proceedings by videoconference without requiring the consent of the parties to this format. The present referral, in which the Enlarged Board will decide whether oral proceedings by videoconference are compatible with the legal right to oral proceedings (Article 116(1) EPC) if all parties to the proceedings have not consented, could be decided in direct contravention with the provisions of that new Article. Thus, there is a question as to whether a legal conflict exists between Article 116 EPC and the new Article 15a RPBA, as the latter appears to be based on the view that oral proceedings by videoconference must be compatible with Article 116 EPC. This conflict would render the particular Board members unable to take an impartial view, because they had performed legislative acts under that assumption which could then be found to contravene the EPC by the decision in this case.
Due to this alleged conflict, the appellant raised objections of suspected partiality against the Chairman and two technical members of the Board in its original composition (X and Y), citing their involvement in bringing Article 15a RPBA into force. One of the legal members (Z) also made submissions about their own involvement in preparing the legislative proposal for amending the RPBA as part of a working party, and requested under Article 24(2) EPC that the Board decide on their continued participation.
The suspicions against X and Y were reasoned with reference to the consultation between the President of the Boards of Appeal and the Presidium (of which X and Y were members) in relation to the proposal for Article 15a RPBA, alleging that the subsequent adoption and approval of that Article signified a positive majority within the Presidium. By a first interlocutory decision dated 17 May 2021, a recomposed Enlarged Board (with all of the objected members replaced pursuant to Article 24(4) EPC) decided that the Chairman and legal member Z were to be replaced in view of their suspected partiality, but technical members X and Y were to remain on the Board in its revised composition. This distinction was made in view of the differences in the level of involvement of each party in the process of bringing the new Article into force, with the Board considering that the Chairman had played an active role in passing legislation and that the visible involvement of legal member Z in drafting that legislation would not inspire confidence in the impartiality of an Enlarged Board comprising Z. The Board concluded that merely sitting on the advisory Presidium of the Boards of Appeal was not enough to objectively justify a suspicion of partiality, as there was no evidence of a majority vote or particular opinion of those members. The revised composition of the Board was adopted by order of 20 May 2021.
Following the first interlocutory decision, the appellant raised further objections of suspected partiality and personal interest in submissions made in the week leading up to the first scheduled oral proceedings; those additional objections and the non-public discussion are the subject of a second interlocutory decision by the Board dated 28 May 2021 and made available on 28 June 2021. In the further submission filed before the first oral proceedings, the appellant objected that the first interlocutory decision referred to brief comments submitted by the replaced members (Reason 9), providing details of their involvement in drafting/approving Article 15a, to which they had only been alerted at the time the first decision was issued. The further objections are well summarised in the second decision – they essentially relate still to requests for replacement of members X and Y for reasons of suspected partiality, as well as the Rapporteur on the grounds of a new allegation of suspected partiality, and an allegedly improper application of Articles 2(2) and 2(3) of the Business Distribution Scheme of the Enlarged Board of Appeal (BDS) in replacing “members” (i.e. those listed under Article 2(1)(a) BDS, including the replacement members in this case) with their “alternates” (i.e. the additional members listed under Article 2(1)(b)BDS).
However, the Enlarged Board in their second decision dismissed all of the appellant’s objections of suspected partiality. In particular, the Board did not consider any of those objections to be reasoned and supported by facts or evidence, because some of the allegations were speculative as to the content of the comments submitted by the members – “we have reason to believe…” – and others made in a general and non-person specific manner. The Board concluded that it had performed its duty in considering the facts available to it at the time of the earlier decision (including the aforementioned comments), i.e. there was no basis for a request of the appellant to be provided with those comments. The appellant extended its objection of suspected partiality to all of the five internal members of the revised Board, who were also present on the original Board, based on allegations that their agreement with the Chairman might be beneficial to them in being selected to remain members of the Enlarged Board; these were, unsurprisingly, deemed late-filed and inadmissible. The appellant had also raised for the first time the question of members having a “personal interest” (Article 24(1) EPC), referencing an alleged bias of the internal members because of their personal preferences for a particular mode of working either remotely or in person. This objection was considered inadmissibly late, overly general, and not substantiated – in particular, the Board noted that no direction of bias was indicated by the appellant. Furthermore, such a general objection would apply to any member of the Board, such that replacement of the objected members could not alleviate the party’s concerns. Finally, in relation to the objection that the replacement of members was improper, the Board did not see any legal provision under which this objection could be considered to be raised; it was not deemed to fall within Article 24 EPC, and so the Enlarged Board was not empowered to change its composition.
The reasoning given in the dismissal of those requests is fully consistent with the first decision, which sets out the legal principles developed in the case law concerning the application of Article 24 EPC (Reasons, point 10):
a. the right to object to a judge for reasons of suspicion of partiality is meant to prevent judges from being influenced in their decision-making … by considerations other than the arguments they consider factually and legally relevant for the case under consideration;
…
e. suspicion of partiality of a judge has to be determined by two tests: firstly, a subjective test requiring proof of actual partiality of the judge concerned, and secondly an objective test, whether the circumstances of the case give rise to an objectively justified fear of partiality;
f. with respect to the subjective test it is presumed that a duly and lawfully appointed judge is personally impartial, unless there is proof of the contrary;
g. with respect to the objective test … [t]his criterion excludes subjective suspicions on the part of the party who makes the objection.
Following a minor delay due to technical difficulties, the Board in its amended composition convened on 2 July 2021, together with three representatives of the appellant and three representatives appearing on behalf of the President of the EPO. The parties were asked to summarise their cases and make any additional oral submissions, with the Board noting the receipt of a further letter of the appellant containing requests addressed only to the Chairman shortly before midnight on 30 June 2021.
The appellant maintained their position on the improper replacement of members of the Enlarged Board with their alternates, and made several allegations about the “diligence” of the Enlarged Board in the proceedings to date: (i) that they had not provided the appellant with a copy of the minutes of the first oral proceedings pursuant to Rule 124 EPC; (ii) that the appellant had agreed to a shorter time limit in a future summons which applied a time pressure to the case, which the Board itself had not “coped” with in issuing a decision so shortly before the second oral proceedings; and (iii) that the Board was not acting fairly in relation to the time it took to provide reasons in a decision as compared with the time made available to the appellant to respond to them, at a direct cost to the party being represented at the proceedings (their client).
The Chairman dismissed these allegations, considering that the second interlocutory decision did not require a response and contained the necessary information which would form minutes of the first proceedings. The appellant was asked to formulate a formal request, should they wish to continue this debate. The first of those requests was that the Enlarged Board declare itself incompetent (!) to deal with the referral by an improper application of Article 2 of the BDS, and that the oral proceedings then be postponed until a new order was issued by the Chairman for a revised composition of the Board to be formed. The representatives of the President of the EPO requested that the appellant’s requests be rejected and a discussion on the point of law be conducted as soon as possible, which was considered to be in the public interest.
After an interruption for deliberation, the Board unsurprisingly dismissed the requests of the appellant and proceeded to the discussion of the referred question.
Finally, the panel entered into the long-awaited discussion of the fundamental legal issues at hand. The scope of the referral, the proper mode of interpretation of Article 116 EPC and purpose of oral proceedings, an assessment of the legal effect, if any, of the modus operandi of the EPO in the circa 40 years to date on the rights of parties, and the question of the effect of consent of parties to proceedings were all discussed. Proceedings were terminated for deliberation of the Board, and we expect a decision in writing in the coming weeks.
Mathys & Squire is delighted to be ranked in the 2021 edition of the IAM Patent 1000: The World’s Leading Patent Professionals directory – the ‘go-to’ guide identifying ‘top patent professionals in key jurisdictions around the globe’. Shining a spotlight on outstanding firms and individuals in patent practice, the guide is compiled based on feedback following an extensive research process involving around 1,800 interviews over a five month period.
In addition to our firm ranking, a record number of Mathys & Squire patent attorneys have been highlighted as recommended individuals: partners Alan MacDougall, Paul Cozens, Dani Kramer, Andrew White and Anna Gregson have all been featured in this year’s edition, alongside Jane Clark, Martin MacLean, Craig Titmus and Chris Hamer, who have been recognised in the guide for a number of years.
The ‘dynamic’ Mathys & Squire is praised for its ‘exceptional’ service, and the team is applauded for helping “clients to adapt their strategies in line with business developments and proactively respond[ing] to changing external circumstances.” A source commented: “Communication is clear and concise, even in relation to the most highly specialised and technical patent applications.”
For more information, and to view the rankings and individual testimonials in full, visit the IAM website here.
Last week the European Patent Office (EPO)’s Enlarged Board of Appeal gave its decision in case G 4/19, in which it had been asked to clarify whether or not double patenting is excluded under the European Patent Convention (EPC), and if so, how that exclusion should be interpreted. The Enlarged Board’s answer essentially confirms existing EPO practice, but stops short of providing the full extent of clarification that had been sought.
Some EPC states, including the UK, have provisions under their national law which aim to prevent double protection for the same invention by both a patent granted under national law and one granted by the EPO. However, the EPC does not contain any explicit provisions banning double protection of the same invention by two EPO-granted patents.
Despite this, the EPO’s practice in recent years has been to refuse to grant patents in circumstances where two applications belonging to the same applicant have identical claims, have the same filing or priority date, and designate overlapping groups of contracting states. In such situations the EPO requires the applicant to either choose one application to proceed to grant, or else to amend the claims of one or both applications, or amend the designated states to remove overlap. As legal basis for this practice the EPO has relied on the notion that “an applicant has no legitimate interest in proceedings leading to the grant of a second patent for the same subject-matter if the applicant already possesses one granted patent for that subject-matter”.
This practice has been highly controversial, not least as it originates from obiter dicta in two earlier Enlarged Board decisions which were concerned with the assessment of added matter in connection with divisional applications, and not with the issue of double patenting per se. The legal basis for these obiter dicta, and so for the EPO’s consequent practice, was uncertain. Questions had also arisen as to the interpretation of this exclusion: for example could an applicant be said to have a ‘legitimate interest’ in obtaining two patents for the same subject-matter based on the additional year of protection provided by one application claiming priority from an earlier application with the same claims?
In decision T 318/14 of 7 February 2019, Technical Board of Appeal 3.3.01 considered the issue of double patenting in detail. After reviewing the legislative background to the EPC and the provisions of the EPC itself, the Board came to the conclusion that it was questionable whether or not the EPC provided any legal basis for the EPO’s practice, and that it may be more appropriate to introduce a prohibition on double patenting through a revision to the EPC rather than through case law. In view of this uncertainty, the Board referred a detailed series of questions to the Enlarged Board of Appeal to seek to clarify whether a legal basis existed for the EPO’s practice excluding double patenting; and, if such a basis existed, what conditions could give rise to a double patenting objection.
In its decision G 4/19, the Enlarged Board recognised that it was being asked to provide a comprehensive ruling on all of these outstanding questions. However, it opted to keep its decision very narrowly focused, and to consider only the issue of legal basis for a double patenting exclusion without exploring the wider implications of such an exclusion beyond the underlying facts of the case which had led to the referral.
The decision provides a lengthy – although, to this author, not entirely convincing – survey of the legislative history behind the EPC, coming to the conclusion that a prohibition on double patenting arises from the intent of the legislator as it may be derived from the travaux préparatoires to the EPC. In the Enlarged Board’s view, this prohibition arises if a patent “claims the same subject-matter as a European patent which has been granted to the same applicant and does not form part of the state of the art pursuant to Article 54(2) and (3) EPC”. The prohibition is applicable if a patent:
This prohibition only applies to the extent that the two applications/patents designate overlapping groups of contracting states.
Given the focus of the Enlarged Board’s decision on providing a legal basis for the EPO’s existing practice, important questions are left unanswered. In particular, the Enlarged Board essentially restricted itself to the facts of the underlying case, in which the same legal entity had acted as applicant in respect of two patent applications having identical claims, one of which claimed priority from the other. The Enlarged Board’s decision therefore provides a legal basis for the EPO to continue refusing patent applications in situations having similar facts, i.e. where the claims and the applicant are undoubtedly the same. However, the wording of the decision leaves open the possibility of disputes regarding the identification of ‘the same subject-matter’. For example, regardless of current EPO practice, does this also potentially apply to partially overlapping claims? The criteria for identification of “the same applicant” have also been left unaddressed. Current EPO practice is to interpret this narrowly, such that a prohibition on double-patenting can be circumvented by, for example, assigning one of the patents or applications to another company within the same corporate group. However, further challenges to the interpretation of these provisions cannot be ruled out.
The Enlarged Board’s stipulation that the prohibition applies only in respect of overlapping designated states also leaves questions unanswered as to how this might be enforced in practice. For example, if both patent applications are still pending, at what point does any overlap in respect of the designated states need to be removed, and how will the EPO monitor to ensure that this is complied with, e.g. if a decision to grant one application has been announced but not yet come into force?
The decision may therefore come as a disappointment in some respects, given that the Enlarged Board has passed up the opportunity to define clear tests and to set clear limitations on the scope of this prohibition. On the other hand, given the criticism which has been levelled at the Enlarged Board for the wide-ranging repercussions and heavily political nature of a number of its other recent decisions, the relative restraint of this decision may be welcome, in that it does not signify any immediate changes to the EPO’s existing practice.
The Chartered Institute of Trade Mark Attorneys (CITMA) recently reported that over 70,000 UK trade mark applications have been filed this year (between January and April 2021), compared to just 37,000 for the same period in 2019 and 2020. 2021 has also seen a surge in monthly international trade mark applications figures, passing the 2,000 mark for the first time in February.
With such a rapid increase in trade mark applications in the UK – almost double the number for the equivalent period in 2019 and 2020 – comes the heightened risk of infringement and dilution. Watching services – in which brand owners’ trade marks are monitored for potentially conflicting new applications across an individual country, region or even worldwide basis – should therefore be prioritised. Mathys & Squire is able to offer a competitively-priced watching service for all trade mark clients. We offer such services on a tiered basis depending on our clients’ requirements.
In the event that clients are alerted to a third party application which is of concern, our team is experienced in assisting clients in opposing such applications in the UK to preserve the distinctive character of their trade marks. We are also well-equipped to assist in settling such conflicts, for instance by way of negotiating coexistence agreements, offering a pragmatic, commercial approach to such conflicts.
The existence of a large number of new applications on the register highlights the importance of performing trade mark register searches prior to filing new trade mark applications in order to assess the risk of conflicts arising early on in the application process. Our team has access to a searching platform which mines data from registries around the world, including the UKIPO, which allows our team to assess the risk in clients adopting new trade marks.
Please do not hesitate to get in contact if you would like any more information regarding the services mentioned above.
Mathys & Squire has been ranked as a leading European patent firm by the Financial Times (FT) for the third year since the inception of Europe’s Leading Patent Law Firms report.
The list is based on recommendations by over 3,200 clients and peers, for services around patent prosecution and patent strategy consultation. In addition to the leading firm ranking, Mathys & Squire is delighted to be featured in four of the specialist sectors this year: Biotechnology & Food, Chemistry & Pharmaceuticals, Electrical Engineering and IT & Software.
We would like to thank all our clients and contacts who have taken the time to recommended the firm as part of the FT’s research.
To access the full report and rankings tables, please visit the FT website here.
The 2021 edition of Managing IP’s IP STARS directory, providing independent research, rankings and analysis across 151 jurisdictions, 1,645 firms and 7,000 practitioners, has now been launched.
Mathys & Squire is delighted to congratulate Jane Clark, Paul Cozens and Hazel Ford, who have all been named as ‘Patent Stars’, as well as Margaret Arnott, Gary Johnston and Rebecca Tew, who have been ranked ‘Trade Mark Stars’. Additionally, David Hobson and Andrew White have been featured as ‘Notable Practitioners’ in the latest guide.
These IP Stars are senior practitioners who have been recommended or identified as leaders in their firm and/or jurisdiction.
The firm is also pleased to have maintained its rankings for ‘Patent prosecution’ and ‘Trade mark prosecution’ in the 2021 directory.
Rising Star rankings are due to be released in September 2021.
For more information, and to view the rankings in full, visit the IP STARS website here.
